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Available online 30 April 2016Basel II introduced a three pillar approach which concentrated upon new capital ratios (Pillar I), new supervisory
procedures (Pillar II) and demanded better overall disclosure to ensure effectivemarket discipline and transparency.
Importantly, it introduced operational risk as a standalone area of the bank which for the ﬁrst time was required to
be measured, managed and capital allocated to calculated operational risks. Concurrently, Solvency II regulation in
the insurance industry was also re-imagining regulations within the insurance industry and also developing opera-
tional riskmeasures. Given that Basel IIwasﬁrst published in 2004 and Solvency IIwas set to go live in January 2014.
This paper analyses the strategic challenges of Basel II in the UK banking sector and then uses the results to inform a
survey of amajor UK insurance provider.We report that the effectiveness of Basel II was based around: the reliance
upon people for effective decision making; the importance of good training for empowerment of staff; the impor-
tance of Board level engagement; and an individual's own world view and perceptions inﬂuenced the adoption of
an organizational risk culture. We then take the ﬁndings to inform a survey utilizing structural equation modelling
to analyze risk reporting and escalation in a large UK insurance company. The results indicate that attitude and un-
certainty signiﬁcantly affect individual's intention to escalate operational risk and that if not recognized by insurance
companies and regulators will hinder the effectiveness of Solvency II implementation.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
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During the 1970s and 1980s the banking industry, in the UK and glob-
ally, experienced a sea change with regards to banking theory, practice
and regulation. These changes can be traced back as far as the liberaliza-
tion of the banking and ﬁnancial markets throughout the 1970s and the
encroachment on each other's traditional business lines during the early
1980s. In the context of these changes, governments and regulators
were keen to ensure the ‘prudent behaviour’ of banks— as deﬁned in reg-
ulation. Here, the importance of capital was the focus of one the ﬁrst
widely accepted international codes in banking – the Basel I Accord
1988 – recognizing the importance of levels of capital held by banking in-
stitutions in creating conﬁdence in the sector and staving off bank col-
lapses. Likewise, European regulators had also recognized the
importance of capital in the insurance industry with some form of capital
requirements being in place since the 1970s under Solvency 1
requirements.Bryce),
@ucdconnect.ie (C. Cheevers),
. This is an open access article underYet, from its implementation, Basel I was already considered inade-
quate to control for the changes occurring in bank operations in both its
calculations of ‘capital adequacy’ and its ability overall to capture the
right metrics to reduce risk within the industry. It was argued that it fo-
cused too much upon credit risk, only acknowledging that “other risks
… need to be taken into account” (BCBS, 1998 p.1). In light of this, the
Accord was amended to include market risk in 1996 and throughout
the 1990s, the Basel Committee worked on introducing a replacement
in the form of Basel II.
Basel II was amajor gear change for the sector, focusing on key areas
in bank operations and improving capital allocations for credit andmar-
ket risk (for example see Jobst, 2007; Rowe, Jovic, & Reeves, 2004;
Santos, 2002; Power, 2005). Signiﬁcantly, for the ﬁrst time, it also intro-
duced metrics that considered ‘operational’ risk as distinct from ﬁnan-
cial risk (usually encompassing liquidity, credit, interest rate and
market risk) and required banks to provide capital for operational risk.
Operational risk is deﬁned as ‘the risk of loss arising from inadequate
or failed internal processes, or from personnel and systems, or from ex-
ternal events’ (CEIOPS, 2009 p5). The impact of the Basel II guidelines
and the rush to be Basel II compliant cannot be overemphasized and
has brought about the rise of operational risk management as a stand-
alone risk within ﬁnancial institutions. Importantly, banks had tothe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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order to comply with Basel II and signal to domestic and international
markets and regulators that they were an effective, efﬁciently operated
institution.
As a result, the banking industry undertook much soul searching
during the 2000s in order to discover the most appropriate ways to im-
plement and complywith the Basel II requirements. This forms the basis
of the ﬁrst stage of the paper which investigates and identiﬁes the key
challenges in the implementation of Basel II and how these were ad-
dressed. We then extend our analysis based on our ﬁndings from
Basel II implementation in the banking industry to examine the imple-
mentation of Solvency II in the insurance industry, which is often re-
ferred to as the Basel II for insurance companies. Solvency II was to be
introduced in January 2014 but has been delayed due to implementa-
tion issues, therefore the timing of such a cross-industry investigation
could not be better.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section the paper dis-
cusses the rise of operational risk as an important element of managing
risk in the banking and insurance sectors, and draws attention to the
management of that risk through the structure of the three lines of de-
fence. This is followed by a description of themethodology employed in
our primary research and a discussion of the results. The paper con-
cludes with limitations and areas for future research.
2. Banking, insurance and regulatory compliance
Banks and insurance companies dominate the UK ﬁnancial services
industry. At the beginning of this decade, the major British banking
groups held £678bn of households assets in the form of personal de-
posits and savings and the UK insurance market was the largest in
Europe, contributing £10.4bn in taxes, with 74% of all households in
the UK using home contents insurance (ABI, 2011; BBA, 2012). Impor-
tantly, the two sectors are both dominated by the management of risk
in their daily operations (Al-Darwish, Hafeman, Impavido, Kemp, &
O'Malley, 2011; Geneva Association, 2010). Insurance company risk is
linked to their ability to assess the ‘correct’ premiums and manage the
volatility of their investments on the ﬁnancial markets. (Geneva
Association, 2010; Hoffman & Lehman, 2009). In contrast, banks are
more exposed, as deposit takers, to liquidity risks and as lenders to cred-
it risk (loans can account for over 60% of a UK retail banks balance sheet,
see individual UKBank annual reports) aswell as undertaking extensive
asset transformation (Gatzert & Wesker, 2012; Lehman & Hoffman,
2010). Nevertheless, both sectors are involved in assuming risk, risk
transfer and risk management. Clearly, both sectors will also encounter
similar types of daily operations in their businesses, and will share sim-
ilar problems. As a result, the experience of operational risk manage-
ment and compliance issues encountered in the banking sector can be
extrapolated to aid operational risk management and compliance in
the insurance industry.
Here, the three Pillars of Basel II (andmore recently Basel III) are im-
portant. They concentrate upon capital ratios (Pillar I), supervisory pro-
cedures (Pillar II) and demand better disclosure to ensure effective
market discipline upon, and transparency of, riskmanagement practices
(Pillar III). Yet the requirement to treat operational risk as a unique and
distinctive risk discipline has posed difﬁculties of deﬁnition, implemen-
tation and strategic planning and created a major operational challenge
for banks around the globe (see Bryce, Webb, & Adams, 2011; Cruz,
2004). It has been a particular issue when accounting for operational
risk in capital allocations in relation to what are considered volatile
and difﬁcult to predict upstream risk events (see for example Cruz,
2002; Power, 2005). More speciﬁcally, the challenges of modelling op-
erational risk in an environment with little historic data and applying
a metric for risk capital means banks have often been torn between a
focus on Pillar 1, which is quantitatively focused, and Pillar 2, which is
more qualitatively focused (Bryce et al., 2011; Cruz, 2002; Hoffman,
2002).Similar issues arise in the international insurance industry, where
operational risk compliance poses one of the largest current issues for
insurance companies. Insurance regulators are cognizant of the learning
experiences of the banking sector, and that operational risk manage-
ment remains under development. However, Warrier (2007) and
Flamee andWindels (2009) believe there are indications that insurance
companies, with the historical experience of the Basel II compliance
process in banks, may well ﬁnd compliance with Solvency II less prob-
lematic. Importantly, more research in both sectors may enable this
process.
Certainly, there are indications that the design of Solvency II has
beneﬁtted from banks' experience of Basel II; for example, in the adop-
tion, as with Basel II, of a hybrid internal approach to the measurement
of operational risk. Nevertheless, like banks, this approach has been lim-
ited by the expected lack of credible data and a lack of robust manage-
ment infrastructure within Pillar 2 of the operational risk control/
assessment frameworks of insurance companies (Bryce et al., 2011;
CEIOPS, 2009). There is also commonality in how regulators of both in-
dustries approach the measurement of risk exposures within the busi-
ness environment. For example, they both prescribe a risk-based
approach using a choice of internal or standardized minimum capital/
solvency requirements. This ﬂexibility to self-regulate (Young, 2012;
Young, 2013) by choosing your own internal measures recognizes the
debates taking place across both industries regarding which models
and statistical approaches are best suited to manage operational risk.
It remains an important issue, as research by, amongst others, Cruz
(2002), Frachot and Roncalli (2001), Frachot, Moudoulaud, and
Roncalli (2003) and Davis (2006) provides clear empirical evidence
suggesting a wide variance in the capital required depending on the se-
lection of the approach taken.
Further, Bryce et al. (2011) have argued that a number of key chal-
lenges remain for regulatory operational risk modelling; including the
collection, availability, frequency and quality of data as well as the suit-
ability of historic losses as predictors of the future (CEIOPS, 2009). At
the same time, qualitative assessments have a key role to play, and Sol-
vency II (learning from Basel II) establishes a set of minimum require-
ments designed to ensure the validity of these internal risk
assessments as inputs to the capital calculations (see BCBS, 2005;
CEIOPS, 2009; Cruz, 2004; Davis, 2006; Frachot & Roncalli, 2002;
Hoffman, 2002). Thus the CEIOPS, 2009 Directive, article 44 states:
Insurance and reinsurance undertakings shall have in place an effec-
tive risk management system comprising strategies, processes and
reporting procedures necessary to identify, measure, monitor, man-
age and report on a continuous basis the risks, at an individual and at
an aggregated level, to which they are or could be exposed, and their
interdependencies.
Solvency II regulation also includes requirements for institutions to
address the issue of scenario analysis, which in turn raises questions
around judgement, and particularly the use of expert judgement, in
the validation of risk assessment and model outputs (see Hall, 2006;
O'Brien, 2011; Rosqvist, 2003; Tversky & Khaneman, 1971). Important-
ly, regulators intend to apply a “use test”, similar to Basel II, to the Sol-
vency II framework to assess how well it is understood, applied and
owned throughout insurance companies. Here, it is clear that organiza-
tions must learn from operational risk events, and both their own and
others experiences.
Overall, past research indicates strong agreement on the actual oper-
ational risk framework that should be implemented to manage opera-
tional risk (see Alexander, 2003; Cruz, 2004; Davis, 2006; Hoffman,
2002), although Cruz (2004) and Blunden and Thirwell (2010) both
highlight the importance of the environment into which the framework
is launched and how fully implementation is achieved. In this regard,
Waring and Glendon (2001) and Chang (2001) note that the key to suc-
cessful implementation is the strength of the operational risk culture —
something which is fundamental to the research undertaken in this
1 We cannot name the ﬁnancial institution due to a conﬁdentiality agreement.
Fig. 1. Stages 1 & 2 research design.
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tute of risk management, which deﬁnes risk culture as:
the values, beliefs, knowledge and understanding about risk shared
by a group of people with a common purpose, in particular the em-
ployees of an organization or of teams or groupswithin an organiza-
tion” (IRM, 2012 p12).
Lavida and Garcia (2006) suggest that risk culture will be a major
strategic challenge that confronts all institutions, which is of particular
importance in this context as Davis (2006) and Waring and Glendon
(2001) both suggest that the culture of risk management within an or-
ganization may affect the collection and processing of loss data.
All of this, in turn, highlights the importance of qualitative manage-
ment as the foundation for quantitative assessment, and both will use
the base data of the outputs from control frameworks, corporate knowl-
edge andhistory as reference points (Tversky & Khaneman, 1971).With
this in mind, it remains surprising how little of the literature discussing
the implementation of the qualitative Pillar 2 requirements of Basel II/III
or Solvency II refer to the accepted management sciences related to
strategy, leadership and change management (for example Porter,
1995, 1996 or Mintzberg & Quinn, 1996 or in the context of operational
risk Bryce et al., 2011). The majority of good practice in the literature
emphasizes process, methodology and adding value when executing
the implementation of key regulatory projects (Alexander, 2003; Cruz,
2004; Davis, 2006; Wilson, 2006).
In terms of the management of risk, the three lines of defence hier-
archical structure for the management of operational risk (IOR, 2010)
details common guidelines for the governance of operational risk man-
agement within ﬁnancial institutions (Bryce, Webb, & Cheevers, 2013).
As previously stated, although the businessmodels of insurance compa-
nies and banks may differ, the fundamentals of operational risk gover-
nance and internal control frameworks remain comparable. This can
be seen, for example, in the implementation of a more robust three
lines structure by Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company required as a
consequence of a Financial Services Authority (FSA) investigation into
ineffective corporate governance within the institution (FSA, 2012).
The ﬁrst line of defence involves day to day risk management at the
operational level, in accordance with agreed risk policies, appetite and
controls. Yet, it is the execution of these policies, processes, procedures
and controls as set out by the second line of defence which the ﬁrst line
of defence has difﬁculty implementing into their ‘business as usual’ ac-
tivities (Bryce et al., 2011, 2013). Previous literature has highlighted ed-
ucation and training, blame culture, and lack of understanding, as key
elementswhich affect the ability of staff in theﬁrst line of defence to en-
gage in operational risk management (Bryce et al., 2011, 2013; Power,
2007; Wahlstrom, 2006).
It is for this reason that this paperwill investigate the effectiveness of
this ﬁrst line of defencewithin a UK insurance company's call centre en-
vironment as they move towards Solvency II. In order to achieve this,
and recognizing that, in implementing Solvency II, insurance companies
may learn from the difﬁculties experienced by UK banks in developing
effective strategies to ensure full compliance and sustainability, we
willﬁrst develop amore in-depth understanding of the issues surround-
ing Basel II implementation within a Major British Banking Group.3. Methodology
The current research targets the dearth of research in the area of op-
erational risk implementation within ﬁnancial institutions. We begin
with a qualitative approach focusing upon a major British banking
group and key external stakeholders as it moved towards advanced
Basel II compliance — undertaking twenty thematic interviews and
four additional ‘in-depth’ semi-structured interviews with UK bank ex-
ecutives. The key ﬁndings of this phase of the research are reported in
this section and inform the development of the second stagemethodol-
ogy— a survey undertaken at a large UK insurance company to help in-
form Solvency II implementation to which we received 111 (n = 111)
completed responses. The survey was designed to utilize structural
equation modelling which is presented in the proceeding section (see
Pearl, 2000). Our approach as depicted by Fig. 1 below looks like this:
Our survey follows the innovative approach of Elbanna, Child, and
Dayan (2013) undertaking the survey within a large provider of
insurance,1 offering customer services as well as insurance sales prod-
ucts via three call centres and reported total revenue of over £40million
for the period 2012/2013. In order to maximize the response rate the
survey was distributed via the company's intranet and the insurance
company gave employees 20 min to complete the survey. This contrib-
uted to a healthy response rate of 44% which compares well to other
survey response rates (Hsu & Chiu, 2004; Poulter, Chapman, Bibby,
Clarke, & Crundall, 2008). Table 1 shows our descriptive statistics.
3.1. Stage one: qualitative study
Following themethod generally considered to be themost appropri-
ate to gather data on processes and decision-making within companies
(Gummesson, 2000) and congruentwith the sample size utilized in pre-
vious research in the area (for example see Bryce et al., 2011;
Wahlstrom, 2006) our qualitative research was conducted in two
phases: twenty thematic interviews within a major UK commercial
bank followed by four in-depth interviews with major stakeholders of
the UK Basel II implementation process.
In line with Lincoln and Guba (1985), Denzin and Lincoln (1994) and
O'Loughlin, Szmigin, and Turnbull (2004) a semi-structured approach
was used to maximize the depth of analysis with each individual. The
four in-depth interviews were then conducted which probed deeper
into areas of interest that the thematic interviews brought to our atten-
tion in line with the work of Barritt (1986), Sykes (1990) or O'Loughlin
et al. (2004). Such purposive sampling allows ﬂexibility and manipula-
tion of themes of particular interest to our research questions (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967). The selection of these participants included a senior FSA
regulator during the development of Basel II for the UK, a ‘grey panther’
for the FSA, the global head of another Major British Banking Groups Op-
erational Risk Consultancy arm, andﬁnally the Chief RiskOfﬁcer of anoth-
erMajor British Banking Group. The objectives of the interviewswere to:
1. identify the key challenges in the Basel II AMA Pillars 1 and 2, and
how these were being addressed;
Table 1
Descriptive survey statistics.
Demographic characteristic Frequency %
Gender
Male 52 47
Female 59 53
Role within the institution
Call centre operative 76 68
Call centre manger/team leader 35 32
Length of time at the institution
0 b 6 months 12 11
6 months ≥ 1 year 16 14
1 year N 3 years 41 37
3 years ≥5 years 17 15
5 years + 24 22
Length of time in current role
0 b 6 months 15 14
6 months ≥1 year 18 16
1 year N 3 years 53 48
3 years ≥5 years 11 10
5 years + 13 12
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risk framework for Basel II Pillar II;
3. generate speciﬁc items for the development of scales for stage 2
survey.
The key outcomes from this initial qualitative stage of the research
emerged within the following themes:
• reliance upon people for effective decision making;
• the importance of good training for empowerment of staff;
• the importance of Board level engagement;
• an individual's ownworld view and perceptions inﬂuenced the adop-
tion of an organizational risk culture.
The respondents highlighted the importance of a top-down ap-
proach to the management of the Basel II compliance, engaging ‘deci-
sion making echelons’ to more effectively embed processes,
procedures and techniques (see also Mikes & Kaplan, 2013). Retrospec-
tively, it is these ‘decision making echelons’ that have been targeted by
UK regulators as to the root cause of the most recent banking crisis, in
the form of poor governance (see Power, 2011 or Young, 2012 p467).
Although the debate between the importance of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 fea-
tured prominently within the qualitative data, it was evident that in the
regulators development of the ‘use test’ they were focusing upon effec-
tive management of the ﬁrm. It seems they have a belief that somehow
the implication of a ‘use test’ will actually make it clear that it is ‘how
you run your business’ that remains paramount.
Following the regulators public exhortations and their desire to see
the models forming part of the decision-making process, we found
that management were required to place the models in the context of
the organization and both understand their importance and obtain em-
ployee buy in (see BCBS, 2006; Leech, 2002). However, it was empha-
sized that it is the employees and the ‘people’ within the organization
which were considered most important in this context, for example,
our initial research identiﬁed the role that human nature plays in creat-
ing errors and reporting them in the ﬁrst line of defence. This concurs
with previous research by Bryce et al. (2011, 2013) or Wahlstrom
(2006) who report that a ‘no blame’ pro-active risk culture will involve
top level buy in, andmore importantly bottom level understanding. Our
research in this phase of our investigation found that “how well and
how far down the organization has the framework been implemented?”
was a key concern for regulators, which again is consistent with Bryce
et al. (2011) and Wahlstrom (2006). However, in contrast to the aca-
demic literature of Chernobai, Jorion, and Yu (2011) or Guegan andHassani (2012) which focuses on the importance of measuring opera-
tional risk in Pillar 1, it was clear from our Stage 1 results that Pillar 2
and the effect that implementation has on ‘employees’ was a more ur-
gent priority in order to safeguard and mitigate operational risk. That
is not to say that the measurement of operational risk is not relevant,
as there was general agreement from all the participants that the
“modelling of risk must form part of any risk management technique”.
Importantly, in banks, it is widely acknowledged that operational
risk manifests itself primarily within the operations level (the ﬁrst line
of defence). However if the second line of defence are not made aware
of a risk occurring via an effective escalation process ﬁltered through
employees within business operations — measurement quickly be-
comes inconsequential (Bryce et al., 2011, 2013; Wahlstrom, 2006).
This conceptual understanding of the operational risk escalation proto-
col within banks also holds true for insurance companies. It is this very
‘risk event’ reportingwhich has been highlighted by the IRM(2012) as a
key indicator to a successful risk culture which has become considered
to be the most effective tool of risk management (IIF, 2008). It is there-
fore natural to assume how and what employees consider the difﬁcul-
ties and aids in escalating operational risk events will be an
appropriate fundamental starting point for assessing “how well and
how far down the organization has the framework been implemented”
from a Solvency II perspective as outlined by CEIOPS (2009, Article 44).
These ﬁndings inform the development of Stage 2 of our methodology.
3.2. Stage 2: development of the conceptual protocol model
Our Stage 2 model is based on the contention that uncertainty and
attitude will impact on the intention of an operative in the ﬁrst line of
defence to escalate operational risks to the second line of defence of
an insurance company. We use the deﬁnition of risk escalation as
outlined by Bryce et al. (2013, p298): “the internal process by which
real or potential operational risks are reported in a manner that com-
plies with agreed institutional policy”. The use of intention as ameasure
of potential behaviour is based upon an approach informed by the The-
ory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behaviour and the more re-
cent Technology Acceptance Model (Ajzen, 1988, 1991; Bryce et al.,
2013; Hsu & Chiu, 2004; Lin, 2010).
We deﬁne uncertainty as a condition where the availability of infor-
mation deviates from the ideal situational state by which to make a de-
cision (see Daft & Lengel, 1986; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997;Milliken, 1987;
Shiu, Walsh, Shaw, & Hassan, 2011). Such interpretation of uncertainty
can be considered either uni-dimensionally (Koufteros, Vonderembse,
& Jayaram, 2005; Lanzetta, 1963) or multi-dimensionally (Shiu et al.,
2011; Urbany, Dickson, & Wilkie, 1989) and builds upon the methodo-
logical work of Bryce, Webb, and Watson (2010), Bryce et al. (2013).
Further, this investigation of the effects of employee uncertainty pro-
vides cross-industry applicability, as the requirement of Pillar 2 of
Solvency II will inevitably lead to the requirement of staff in the ﬁrst
line of defence to address new processes and procedures.
As highlighted by the Stage 1 qualitative research, during Basel 2
roll-out, if implementation at the lower levels of the organization is
not performed correctly it can lead to a situation where the availability
of information deviates from the ideal. As such, Stage 2 takes this into
consideration and investigates uncertainty in the intention to escalate
operational risks using a uni-dimensional scale grounded in the disag-
gregated constructs as highlighted originally by Urbany et al. (1989).
For purposes of hypothesis development, Fig. 2 depicts our concep-
tualmodel. Standard statisticalmethodswereused to test the conceptu-
al model and Conﬁrmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were conducted to
ensure the survey items used were measuring the underlying latent
constructs of attitude, uncertainty and behavioural intention. In addi-
tion, structural equation modelling (SEM) was implemented to test
the relationships between the constructs and the ﬁt of the hypothesised
conceptual model as a whole, due to its ability to consider a number of
regression equations simultaneously. Previous studies that have added
Fig. 2. Conceptual model of intentions in operational risk escalation.
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banking adoption (Gu, Lee, & Suh, 2009; Luarn & Lin, 2005), Insurance
purchasing behaviour (Hellier, Geursen, Carr, & Rickard, 2003), Firm
Capital structure (Baranoff, Papadopoulos, & Sager, 2007), and Financial
services trust (Malaquias & Hwang, 2016). The use of SEM in this cur-
rent study is further supported by its ability to determine the dynami-
cally interactive relationship between the variables as outlined below
in Fig. 2. CFA and SEM were undertaken via AMOS 20, with descriptive
analysis provided by PASW 18.
We utilize a number of hypotheses:
H1. Uncertainty negatively affects intention to escalate operational
risks.
The formalized procedures of staff training and professional devel-
opment have been outlined in Stage 1 as a critical factor in the empow-
erment and effectiveness of staff to manage operational risks. Previous
research considered this within banking, with the most recent studies
alluding to education and training incentivizing staff to escalate events
due to increased participant's certainty and awareness of the area (see
Blunden& Thirwell, 2010; Bryce et al., 2011; IRM, 2012;Mikes &Kaplan,
2013; Power, 2005). Further, the IRM (2012) highlight the importance
of risk management skills development and technical training as perti-
nent to an effective risk culture. This informs our second hypothesis:
H2. Staff training has a negative effect upon employee uncertainty.
The role of attitude and more speciﬁcally attitudes towards behav-
iour has also been widely acknowledged as an important precursor to
actual behaviour in the literature. Within the banking industry employ-
ee attitudes in drivingwhat is now considered ‘risk culture’ has received
signiﬁcant attention both in policy and industry best practise (by
amongst others Ashby, Power, & Palermo, 2012 and the IRM, 2012).
The IRM (2012) study further states that from the perspective of ﬁnan-
cial services risk attitude: ‘is the chosen position adopted by an individ-
ual or group towards risk, inﬂuenced by risk perception and pre-
disposition’ (p7). To place this in the context of the current study, if a
key indicator of good risk culture involves risk escalation, then positive
attitudes towards that behaviour would increase intention to escalate
operational risks. This therefore informs our third hypothesis:
H3. Attitude has a positive effect on intention to escalate operational
risks.
We test whether a signiﬁcant negative relationship between uncer-
tainty and attitude exists,which goesmuch further than the IRM (2012)
suggestion that ‘perception’ and ‘pre-disposition’ explain development
of attitudinal constructs of risk behaviour. We contend that:
H4. Attitude and uncertainty are signiﬁcantly negatively related to each
other.With these hypotheses in mind Table 2 below lists the ﬁnal survey
questions used to measure each latent construct, in the interests of
brevity a full copy of the survey is available on request. All the questions
were pseudo-randomlymixed together in linewith Poulter et al. (2008)
to reduce respondent bias.
4. Structural equation modelling
4.1. Measurement model
Themeasurement model was evaluated for reliability, convergent va-
lidity and discriminant validity of the three constructs included in our
model. Conﬁrmatory factor analyses offered strong support that the sur-
vey itemsmeasured the hypothesised latent constructs of uncertainty to-
wards risk reporting, attitude towards risk reporting, and behavioural
intention to report risks. As can be seen by Table 2 above, all constructs
are above 0.7 in relation to construct reliability thus indicating a good
ﬁt. Convergent validity was assessed in line with the two criteria set out
by Fornell and Larcker (1981) with all factor loadings exceeding 0.7 and
average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct exceeding the vari-
ance due tomeasurement error for that construct (that is it should exceed
0.5). Discriminant validity was also examined and accepted using the
Fornell and Larcker (1981) test of AVE exceeding the squared correction
between that and any other construct. In conclusion the measure for
each latent construct satisﬁes construct validity in this current research
context.
4.2. Model ﬁt results
Table 3 indicates that all hypothesised pathways as outlined in Fig. 2
were signiﬁcant (p b 0.05) with attitude displaying the largest effect on
operational risk escalation intention. Themodelwas tested for goodness
of ﬁt with Χ2 29.837 (p = 0.19), RMSEA = 0.047, CFI = 0.992, and
NFI = 0.963. With goodness of ﬁt tests exceeding all their common ac-
ceptable levels the model is considered an excellent ﬁt to the data (see
Barrett, 2007; Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008; Hu & Bentler, 1999;
Steiger, 2007). The explanatory power of the research model is also
identiﬁed with R2 of 0.506, thus suggesting that both attitude towards
risk escalation behaviour and uncertainty account for over 50% of the
variance in intention to escalate operational risks within the call centre
environment.
5. Discussion
As previously theorized by Urbany et al. (1989) and Shiu et al.
(2011) uncertainty affects intention to enact a behaviour. Our results
suggest that where the availability of information deviates from the
ideal situational state bywhich tomake a decision the intention to esca-
late operational risk events deteriorates thus we accept H1. We there-
fore ﬁnd, in line with the IRM (2012) that given the importance of risk
escalation as an indicator of strong risk culture those institutions that
canminimize this ‘uncertainty’maywell increase the number of events
escalated within their organization. This inevitably has important con-
sequences both for risk management, but also for overall performance
as early detection and escalation is critical to the minimization of loss
of earnings as also reported by Bryce et al. (2011, 2013).
This process of what Cooke (2003) refers to as ‘incident learning’ by
riskmanagerswithin the organization can only ever be improved by en-
suring events do not go unchecked or unnoticed in the ﬁrst line of de-
fence, which in this current study was the ﬁnancial institution
environment. Interestingly, within this ﬁrst line of defence no signiﬁ-
cant differences exist between employee hierarchy in relation to atti-
tudes or intention, however, a signiﬁcant difference emerges in
relation to the construct of uncertainty. Unsurprisingly call centre asso-
ciates reported signiﬁcantly higher scores on the uncertainty scale
(M = 3.79, SD = 1.39) than call centre managers/team leaders, given
Table 2
Survey items used and measurement robustness checks.
Constructs Standardized CFA
loadings
Construct
reliability
Average variance
extracted
Intention (7 point strongly disagree to strongly agree) 0.966 0.904
1. I intend to report operational risk losses/events in the next twelve weeks should they arise 0.930
2. I plan to report operational risk losses/events in the next twelve weeks should they arise 0.986
3. I want to report operational risk losses/events in the next twelve weeks should they arise 0.935
Attitude (7 point scale)
Overall, I think that reporting operational risk losses/events is...?
0.884 0.718
4. Very ineffective/very effective 0.753
5. Very harmful/very beneﬁcial 0.929
6. Very foolish/very wise 0.851
Uncertainty (7 point strongly disagree to strongly agree) 0.871 0.693
7. I am sure of my knowledge and understanding of what operational risk losses/events are 0.841
8. I am aware of the correct reporting channels for the reporting of operational risks losses/events 0.812
(7 point scale)
9. When you come across various risk losses/events how sure are you of what to choose to report as
an operational risk loss/event?
Very unsure/very sure
0.844
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from associates (thus reducing uncertainty|) as they are one level above
them in the reporting hierarchy (M = 3.09, SD = 1.17; t(99) = 2.44,
p = 0.02). It is reassuring to observe a lack of divergence in attitude
and intention between managers and their subordinates albeit not un-
common in the behavioural literature (Burks & Krupka, 2012; Krupka
&Weber, 2009). Such a divergence could have indicated a lack of consis-
tency in not only the treatment of risk events should they occur, but also
in how managers and their subordinates consider the importance of
reporting of risk within their work environment. It is this consistency
in the values and beliefs around risk, between and across hierarchical
structures, that is key to the fostering of an effective risk culture (IRM,
2012).
It has been widely recognized that employee training and profes-
sional development are critical to escalation and we report a negative
and signiﬁcant relationship (Spearman's rho,−0.68 p b .01) between
level of agreement with the question ‘the education and training that
have been provided enables me to better report operational risk
losses/events’ and the latent construct ‘uncertainty’, thus we accept
H2. The importance of on-going training to reduce uncertainty is evi-
dent in our current study, independent samples T-tests identiﬁed that
there were no signiﬁcant differences between job length and attitude
and intention, but signiﬁcantly higher levels of uncertainty were
found in staff who had been working in their job for less time. The anal-
yses indicates that those employeeswhohave beenworking in their job
for three years or less scored higher on the uncertainty scale (M=3.86,
SD = 1.37) than those working there for over three years (M = 3.10,
SD = 1.22; t(99) = 2.82, p= 0.006).
In itself this result around ‘tenure’ and its importance to trainingmay
seem irrelevant, however the behavioural work of Blau (1960), van
Maanen (1975), De Cooman et al. (2009), and Moynihan and Pandey
(2007) suggests that altruistic and pro-social behaviours (in this case
risk escalation intention) should decline with tenure within organiza-
tions. Given the nature of the continual training speciﬁc to risk within
the workplace under investigation it is evident that this pro-socialTable 3
Structural equation model and path inﬂuence results.
β C.R. Supported
+ H1 Attitude→ Intention .475 4.716⁎ Yes
− H2 Uncertainty→ Intention −.350 −3.568⁎ Yes
− H3 Uncertainty↔ Attitude −.474 −3.165⁎ Yes
C.R. = critical ratio, β = standardized loading, R2 intention = 0.506.
⁎ p b 0.05.decline with tenure is unsubstantiated. In fact, as an employees tenure
increases so does the amount of training they receive, thus reducing
their uncertainty around risk escalation as it becomes a normative re-
sponse derived from training supporting previous research (Bryce
et al., 2013; IRM, 2012; Mikes & Kaplan, 2013; Power, 2005). It is not
surprising that in other sectors, such as aviation, inappropriate or lack
of training can be considered a precondition to unsafe acts when retro-
spectively forensically examining air accidents (see Olsen & Shorrock,
2010).We report that the same conditions apply in the insurance indus-
try, particularly training outside the remit of their main duties, which in
the call centre environment involves primarily sales, to improve the risk
culturewithin those organizations. If ﬁnancial regulators are increasing-
ly interested in the ‘breadth and depth of understanding of riskmanage-
ment’within organizations (as outlined in the Stage 1 interviews of this
current study) then it will be important that training reﬂects this, espe-
cially if it reduces risk ‘uncertainty’within a workforce as is the case in
this current study.
As regards ‘risk culture’ receiving increased attention from institu-
tions, the analysis of underlying attitudes that cultivate and foster posi-
tive behaviours and risk culture was important. As expected in H3,
positive attitudes towards the escalation of operational risk events sig-
niﬁcantly affect intention to escalate operational risks. However the
contention that ‘risk perception’ and ‘pre-disposition’ are the funda-
mental antecedent factors that affect attitude as outlined by the IRM
(2012) fails to take into account the interrelationship of uncertainty as
witnessed by the acceptance of H4 (r=−4.74, p b 0.05). This is of par-
ticular importance given the reality of working environments, as the
‘awareness-based’ detection (see Kontogiannis & Malakais, 2008) that
is required for risk escalation clearly has at least one other signiﬁcant
and negative factor (uncertainty).
This could reduce attitudewhich is unique from ‘risk perception’ and
‘pre-disposition’ as outlined by the IRM (2012). The relationship as
outlined in Fig. 2, albeit interesting, led the study in an unintended di-
rection. From the survey it was revealed that a subset of questions as
outlined below in Table 4, now baptized ‘risk integrity’ (Cronbach
alpha = 0.754) was found to be a strong predictor of positive attitude
(Beta = 0.459, p b .001) and Uncertainty (Beta =−0.497, p b .001) in
their duties towards risk escalation. This is the ﬁrst time, to the authors'
knowledge, that a construct internal to the employee has been developed
and tested which can predict traits that may be beneﬁcial in the creation
of a risk culture and management of risk by ﬁnancial institutions.
The intrinsic motivation to learn about risk, willingness to exert ef-
fort to report risk, and the pride that an employee has in there riskman-
agement track recordwould appear to be traits that are conducive to the
development of improved ‘overall risk management capability’.
Table 4
Risk integrity construct and analysis.
Questions contained within the risk integrity construct
I would like more information in order to understand my institution's operational risk
policy
(1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’)
Having a good risk management track record is important to me
(1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’)
I would be prepared to invest a lot of effort in operational risk reporting
(1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly agree’)
R2 B Std. Error Beta
DV = attitude .201**
Risk integrity .439 .103 .459***
Controlling for work environment
Job role .299 .294 .135
Volume of calls −.145 .301 −.048
Length of time spent in role .097 .282 .046
Education −.271 .254 −.116
DV = uncertainty .594***
Risk integrity −.630 .098 −.497***
Controlling for work environment
Job role −.101 .279 −.035
Volume of calls −.560 286* −.139
Length of time spent in role −.551 .268* −.196
Education −.919 .241*** −.297
⁎ p b=.05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b .001.
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improvement in overall capability, i.e. a generalised capacity to in-
vestigate, to learn, and to act, without knowing in advance what
one will be called to act upon, is a vital protection against unexpect-
ed hazards” (p.70).
With this in mind, future research investigating this ‘risk integrity’
concept could prove useful not only in employee recruitment but also
in evaluating the effectiveness of organizational risk learning and devel-
opment programmes pre/post their completion. We believe this con-
struct aligns closely to what Arnaud and Schminke (2012) refer to as
‘collective moral emotion’ and could pave the way for the development
of an even deeper insight into the behavioural norms and peer effects
(Ahern, Duchin, & Shumway, 2014; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Mazar
& Ariely, 2006) that surround risk management within organizations.6. Conclusions
The paper followed a mixed-methods design in an interesting and
scarcely researched area of ﬁnancial services risk management. The
ability to obtain primary qualitative and quantitative data allowed us
to uncover important and interesting dimensions of the risk manage-
ment process in ﬁnancial institutions. In addition, it allowed us to pro-
vide enriched explanations of the behavioural intention to escalate
risks. Interest in this area arises for several reasons. First, previous re-
search in this contextual setting has found that attitude and other con-
structs of the theory of planned behaviour do not account for the effects
of uncertainty on the risk escalation procedure. Second, knowing more
about individual decision processes and what makes effective ‘risk
aware’ employees has practical consequences for effective riskmanage-
ment design and best practice. Third, a plethora of new documentation
surrounding best practice riskmanagement and culturewithin ﬁnancial
institutions has been brought to bear on the academic community with
little or no evidence to support it. In addition to this, if we consider the
initial escalation of a risk event detailed in this paper as the ﬁrst step to-
wards themeasurement and management of this event, then it is ratio-
nale to suggest that risk escalation would therefore be a precursor to
‘event study’ type methodologies that use operational risk events asthe subject of their investigation. Finally, increased regulatory attention
in the effectiveness of riskmanagement frameworks at the lowest levels
of ﬁnancial institutions should clearly inform Solvency II compliance.
The past should inform the future and insurance companies can learn
from the banking sector.
Our results highlight the importance of uncertainty and attitude in
the decision making process. Further, the existence and identiﬁcation
of a newemployee concept ‘risk integrity’ allows for interesting avenues
of further exploration. It is envisaged that future studies will encompass
in situ experimentation and analysis of actual behaviour by way of rat-
iﬁcation, but also encourage industry application of the concept. If it is
the case within ﬁnancial organizations as outlined by the qualitative in-
terviews in stage 1 that reliance upon people for good decision-making
exists, then it is only a matter of time before legislative policy and regu-
lations reﬂect this. Themove by regulators towards a ‘use test’ thatmea-
sures the effectiveness of how well risk frameworks are embedded
within organizations maywell be that signal, which could be reinforced
by the inclusion of behavioural metrics of effective risk management as
outlined in this current study.
With Solvency II implementation on-going, the readiness of staff to
accept new processes, and the ability to disseminate information to ‘de-
cision makers’ in a fashion that enables rather than disables risk man-
agement behaviour should not be understated. This study highlights
the importance of both from a qualitative and quantitative training
and educational development perspective. Evidence within the current
study suggests that both attitude and information certainty fostered by
training and education around risk management process/procedures
maywell be the fundamental building blocks of a coherent and effective
risk culture, and therefore risk management strategy.Acknowledgements
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